W. B. Gallie; IX.—Essentially Contested Concepts, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 56, Issue 1, 1 June , Pages – Conceptual confusion has long been a source of difficulty in the study of politics. W. B. Gallie’s analysis of ‘essentially contested concepts’, published in ‘W.B. Gallie and Essentially Contested Concepts’. Re-Reading of W.B. Gallie, ‘ Essentially Contested Concepts’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian.
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Social and Political Philosophy categorize this paper. Although Gallie’s term is widely used to denote imprecise use of technical terminologyit has a far more specific application. However, the members may still disagree over many of these “controversial cases”; and differences of this sort indicate that members haveor act uponentirely different theories of why and how each of the “standard cases” are, in fact, genuine acts of “unfairness”. This page was last edited on 16 Juneat Essentially Contested Concepts and Moral Autonomy.
Freeden remarks that “not all essentially contested concepts signify valued achievements; they may equally signify disapproved and denigrated phenomena”,  and Gerring  asks us to imagine just how difficult it would be to “[try] to craft definitions of slavery, fascism, terrorism, or genocide without recourse to ‘pejorative’ attributes”.
But once [we] let the truth out of the bag — i. And, although the notion could be misleadingly and evasively used to justify “agreeing to disagree”,  the term offers something more valuable:.
Essentially contested concepts involve widespread agreement on a concept e. Open Concepts and Contested Concepts. When discussing finance, “bank” is an essentially contested concept; because the discussion involves establishing the “correct” application, meaning or interpretation of this polysemous term.
IX.—Essentially Contested Concepts | Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society | Oxford Academic
A Reconsideration”, Philosophy and RhetoricVol. Gallie – – Philosophical Quarterly 6 Retrieved from ” https: The term essentially contested concepts gives a name to a problematic situation that many people recognize: Clarke then drew attention to the substantial differences between the expressions “essentially contested” and “essentially contestable”, that were being extensively used within the literature as though they were interchangeable.
Hansen – – Studies in Philosophy and Education 29 2: Yet, to state that a concept is “contestable” is to “attribute some part of any contest to the concept”. Art as an Essentially Contested Concept. Ehrenberg – – International Journal of Law in Context 7: In an attempt to account for cases where disputants trace their individual notions back to entirely differentbut mutually compatible exemplarsConnollyp.
The descriptive definition is still a definition, even if one may think it less interesting than Gallie’s definition. Dworkin argues that this admission of error would not entail any “change” to his original instructions, because the true meaning of his instructions was that “[he] meant the family to be guided by the concept of fairness, not by any specific conception of fairness [that he] might have had in mind”.
Clarke has made a valuable contribution to the overall debate by suggesting that, in order to determine whether a particular dispute was a consequence of true polysemy or inadvertent homonymy, one should seek to “locate the source of the dispute”. Sign in to use this feature. An Interdisciplinary Journal of PhilosophyVol.
Essentially contested concept
In other words, this is “to cocepts that some feature or property of the concept makes it polysemantic, and that the concept contains some internal conflict of ideas”; and it is this fact that provides the “essentially contested concept” with its inherent potential for “generating disputes”.
Susanne Gibson – – Bioethics 18 3: Aprilpp. Rape as an Essentially Contested Concept. Sheila Jasanoff – – Science and Engineering Ethics 17 4: Yet is also clear that “if the notion of logical justification can be applied only to such theses and arguments as can be presumed capable of gaining in the long run universal agreement, the disputes to which the uses of any essentially contested concept give rise are not genuine or rational disputes at all” [ clarification needed ] Gallie, a, p.
Merrill – – Metaphilosophy 23 4: Debates and applications”Journal of Political Ideologies Vol. David-Hillel Ruben – – Philosophical Papers 39 2: Views Read Edit View history. Scholars such as H.
John Kekes – – Philosophy and Rhetoric 10 2: It has been treated as a challenge in that theorists consider their uses of terms and concepts to be in competition with conested uses advocated by other theorists, each theorist trying to be deemed the champion.