JP 3-15.1 PDF

JP 3-15.1 PDF

JP , Geospatial Intelligence in Joint Operations. JP , Countering Air and Missile Threats. JP , Military Deception. JP Counter Improvised Explosive. Device (C-IED) Awareness. SM Timothy POWER, CAN-A. NSO Joint Effective Risk Communicatinos for the Counter Improvised. Joint Publication Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Operations. pages; For Official Use Only; January 9, Download.

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It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans.

It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of -315.1 United States in joint operations, and provides the doctrinal basis for the planning and conduct of joint C-IED operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders JFCs and prescribes joint doctrine for operations, education, and training.


Therefore, eliminating individuals only provides temporary and limited solutions to countering IED threats.

But as networks function and move resources information, money, supplies, recruits from the highest to the lowest echelons, these activities are detectable and targetable. It outlines responsibilities, provides command and control considerations, discusses organizational options, details the C-IED process and attack the network methodology, and introduces models for coordinating with C-IED supporting organizations.

U This publication provides joint doctrine for planning and executing counter-improvised explosive device 3-151 operations.

JP , Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Operations ( Pages )

At the lowest echelons, the local cell members are detectable, targetable, and replaceable. At the highest echelons, the leadership rarely communicates openly and generally uses trusted aides and couriers to provide broad guidance to subordinates and direct the network.

While ideology may produce recruits, they have to eat, obtain weapons, travel, and build, transport, and emplace bombs. It is j; the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective.


To avoid detection and attack, adversary networks camouflage and constantly revise, or adapt, their TTP. However, C-IED operations must be accomplished within the context of successfully targeting the broader adversary infrastructure.

U This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.