The standard view of philosophical methodology is that philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence. Herman Cappelen argues that this claim is false: it is not true. Herman Cappelen The moral rights of the author have been asserted. First Edition published in Impression: 1. All rights reserved. No part of this. Liberating Content. The Inessential Indexical. Philosophy without Intuitions Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever Oxford University Press, forthcoming
|Published (Last):||7 May 2011|
|PDF File Size:||20.78 Mb|
|ePub File Size:||13.8 Mb|
|Price:||Free* [*Free Regsitration Required]|
Classical, Early, and Medieval World History: Reply to Boghossian Intuitions and Intellectual Seemings: How Not to Test for Philosophical Expertise. John marked it as withoutt Dec 11, Elfriede rated it it was ok Jan 28, But why would anyone think that? He is the author of many papers and three books: Introduction to Part I.
And that, it seems, goes for all the other views of intuitions that Cappelen considers. Civil War American History: Two Potential Problems with Philosophical Intuitions: Steve Clarke – – Philosophical Papers 42 2: Fixing Language can be ordered intuiitons Amazon.
The diagnostics include being ‘evidence recalcitrant’, ‘non-inferential and non-experiential’, ‘based solely on conceptual competence’, and having ‘seems-true’ phenomenology; ; Rather, the philosopher puts considerable effort into ensuring that the judgments are safely in the pre-theoretic common ground, which would presumably save them from the trouble of considering any salient cappelne.
Read more about the book external link. Are the definitions right? Diagnostics for intuitiveness 8. He works in philosophy of language, philosophical methodology and related areas of epistemology, metaphysics, and philosophy of mind. Farouk Adil marked it as to-read Aug hermxn, How to do that?
I hope that this work inspires similar investigations that continue his important project and deepen his normative critique without being so irresponsible and brash about philosohpy. Ten philosophical thought experiments 9. Cappelen hammers on that unclarity and does some “anthropology of philosophy”, by looking at examples of famous arguments Burge’s arthritis case, Thompson’s trolley case, Perry’s trail of sugar in the supermarket and observing how it’s not clear how, if at all, they rely on intuitions.
Intuitionw candidate role of this kind is at the heart of the ‘method of cases’ hernan roughly: His suggestion that m Could have been SO good. Oxford Scholarship Online This book is available as part of Oxford Scholarship Online – view abstracts and keywords at book and chapter level. Some Strategies for Charitable Reinterpretation. Want to Read Currently Reading Read.
The Laws of Belief Wolfgang Spohn. Reply to Weatherson Philosophy without Minimal Intuitions: Insensitive Semantics is available at Amazon. More importantly, it’s unclear what motivates certain pairings e. At worst, analytic philosophers are guilty of engaging in somewhat irresponsible use of ‘intuition’-vocabulary. Ignorance and Moral Obligation Michael J. Don’t have an account? There is no better place than this volume for graduate students and professional philosophers to get a sophisticated introduction to recent debates about philosophical methods.
The goal of this book is to argue that this concern is unwarranted since the claim is false: For employees Norwegian website. Goodreads helps you keep track of books you want to read. Say I have a justified claim that a body is on the ground. Except where’s the soul? My library Help Advanced Book Search.
Open Preview See a Problem? The book succeeds in its stated aim to show that arguments put forward in favour of essential indexicality are often shallow, border on the rhetorical, and that the notion of “perspective” probably has little philosophical mileage With one exception to phliosophy discussed below they’re all substantive theoretical hypotheses about the key mental states jerman the mental states that supposedly are, or provide, the evidence at issue — interesting but controversial claims about the nature of these states, and their epistemic features e.
Philosophy Without Intuitions by Herman Cappelen
Corin Suta marked it as to-read Sep 04, No matter what area you happen to work in and what views you happen to hermxn in those areas, you are likely to think that philosophizing requires constructing cases and making intuitive judgments about those cases. This, more than anything else I’ve read recently, has made me reconsider how I should be going about my research.
Read this alongside some other recent reflections on philosophical methodology, like Alexander’s Experimental Philosophy and Baz’s When Words Are Called Forand the basic assumption of those works, that intuition is central to philosophical theorizing, will look a lot less obvious. Publications Pages Publications Pages. Elmar added it Dec 01, The Spiritual Automaton Eugene Marshall. As Cappelen himself admits in response to an anonymous reviewer with the same criticism, we can only read a theory as giving an argument for a judgment if alternatives to the judgment are salient options, and yet I see no evidence in many of his cases that they are.
I just wish that Cappelen had approached the wifhout demarcation problem in a more straightforward and philosophically searching way: