In this elegantly crafted book, Miranda Fricker’s timely project of “looking at the negative space that is epistemic injustice” (viii) comes to fruition. : Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing ( ): Miranda Fricker: Books. Fricker shows that virtue epistemology provides a general epistemological idiom in which these issues can be forcefully discussed.
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Assessment Sensitivity John MacFarlane. Hermeneutical injustice is the kind of injustice experienced by groups who, because due to prejudice they have been less able to participate in the practices that generate new concepts e. Hence the very idea of epistemic injustice is innovative to the point of initiating a conceptual shift in epistemology as it has traditionally been practiced.
Miranda Fricker – – Theoria: Domination, Epistemic Injustice and Republican Epistemology. Request removal from index.
There is much to admire in Fricker’s book. Yet they operate differently in that testimonial injustice is an individual-to-individual fricmer, reliant though it is on features of social-group identity, whereas hermeneutical injustice, with its roots in the collective hermeneutical resource, invokes different culpability issues, some of which refer to institutional, social policies and practices held in place, and tacitly justified, by what I call an instituted social imaginary.
Epistemic Injustice – Paperback – Miranda Fricker – Oxford University Press
She may make a good case, but prejudice causes the listeners to believe her arguments to be less competent or sincere and thus less believable. More Justice is one of the oldest and most central themes of philosophy, but sometimes we would do well to focus instead on injustice.
In white patriarchal societies such epistemic humiliations, often manifested in blank incredulity, are commonplace reactions to women’s and other Others’ academic, personal, or professional aspirations. This is an important and timely book, argued with care and illustrated with detailed and compelling examples. Classical, Early, and Medieval Plays and Playwrights: Retrieved 8 March This book argues that there is a distinctively epistemic genus of injustice, in which someone is wronged specifically in their capacity as a knower, wronged therefore in a capa David Coady – – Episteme 7 2: The book is not only a wonderful, ambitious attempt frickr bring ethics and epistemology together in a way that has rarely been done before, it is also a beautiful, and powerful, attempt to name something that matters.
It is clear, well-written and well-structured. Sherman – – Social Epistemology 30 3: When, for example, the language of “sexual harassment”, “racism”, “homophobia”, or “sexism” had not achieved common currency in the rhetorical spaces of western societies, an entire range of experiential reports could not claim a hearing or expect communal uptake, in a strong sense of “could”.
Prejudice, as Fricker well frickfr, is “a powerful visceral force” 98 condoned, perpetuated, and insulated against condemnation in social-cultural situations where there are no obvious reasons, no pay-offs, no rewards for examining it or, a fortiorifor attempting to purge it.
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Justice is one of the oldest and most central themes in philosophy, but in order to reveal the ethical dimension of our epistemic practices the focus must shift to injustice. In epistemology, the very idea that there is a first-order ethical dimension to our epistemic practices — the idea that there is such a thing as epistemic justice — remains obscure until we adjust the philosophical lens so that we see through to the negative space that is epistemic injustice.
Request removal from index. Justice is one of the oldest and most central themes of philosophy, but sometimes we would do well to focus instead on injustice. Anyone whose philosophical interest in the concept of knowledge extends beyond merely definitional issues, and addresses its ethical and political dimensions as well as its genealogy, can ill afford to ignore this book” — Axel Gelfert, Times Literary Supplement.
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A Little of Her Language. The questions admit of no easy answers and Fricker supplies none, although she rightly fricke that a “‘vulgar’ relativist” resistance to passing moral judgement on other cultures “is incoherent” Moreover, the book is beautifully written” –Martin Kusch, Mind “In this elegantly crafted book, Miranda Fricker’s timely project of ‘looking at the negative space that is epistemic injustice’ comes to fruition Fricker is most well known for her exploration of “epistemic injustice,” the act of wronging someone “in their capacity as a knower.
The analysis of multiple, often subtle, but sometimes cruder operations of prejudice, deftly exemplified in literary and “real life” instances, is one of the most impressive sections of the book. Admittedly, it would be dangerous — even potentially disastrous — to contest Fricker’s ordering outright, to imply that the ethical might have to injuetice to epiistemic expediency or could justifiably give way to the pressures of vested interest.
Testimonial Injustice occurs when a hearer fails, because of prejudice, to give due credit to the word of a speaker. Retrieved from ” https: We are also knowers-something that tends to be forgotten by power-obsessed postmodern theorizing. University Press Scholarship Online. Nor is virtue conceived in abstraction from the materiality of places, persons, and communities: Worth noting, too, is Fricker’s reading of Simone de Beauvoir’s “epistemic humiliation” in a well-known argument with Jean-Paul Sartre: Our Faithfulness to the Past Sue Campbell.
Relational Knowing and Epistemic Injustice: Yet collective identity prejudice can complicate the development of virtuous testimonial sensibilities and of credibility judgements untainted by unjust, socially sedimented emotional responses. Oxford University Press The Laws of Belief Wolfgang Spohn. Questions of doxastic responsibility and how best to exercise it; of how responsible hearers should develop and practice testimonial sensibility to enable them to be “critically open to the word of others”, shape the neo-Aristotelian conception of the virtuous subject, “‘trained’ or socially educated … to see the world in moral colour … [on] an analogy with … a virtuous agent’s ethical sensibility” In this kind of case, Fricker argues injustcie as well as there being fircker injustice caused by possible outcomes such as the speaker missing a promotion at work fricke, there is a testimonial injustice: End Matter Bibliography Index.
In this exploration of new territory between ethics and epistemology, Miranda Fricker argues that there is a distinctively epistemic fficker of injustice, in which someone is wronged specifically in their capacity as a knower. No categories specified categorize this paper. Josh Dohmen – – Res Philosophica 93 4: