In the philosophy of language, the distinction between concept and object is attributable to the German philosopher Gottlob Frege. Overview. According to Frege, any sentence that expresses a singular thought consists Frege, G. ” On Concept and Object”, originally published as “Ueber Begriff und Gegenstand” in. Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob Frege was a German philosopher, logician, and mathematician. He is .. Original: “Ueber Begriff und Gegenstand”, in Vierteljahresschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie XVI (): –;; In English: “Concept. Download Citation on ResearchGate | Kerry und frege über begriff und gegenstand 1 | After describing the philosophical background of Kerry’s work, an account.
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InFrege sent Jourdain comments on his manuscript. Thus, the number term only forms part of the higher-order property ascribed to the concept, so that the objectual nature of number and the attributive character of ascriptions of number are compatible after all.
Über Begriff und Gegenstand
Oxford University Press, third edition second edition, ; the first edition of is listed separately as Martinich  McGuinnessB.
Quinton in Quinton and Quinton Strawson  pp. Reprinted in LU and KStr.
History and Interpretation” Oxford University Press. Mirror Sites View this site from another server: This image can also be seen on Gallica: In this article, Frege criticizes Hilbert’s understanding and use of the axiomatic method. Views View Edit History. But even granting ggeenstand second-order logic may count as logic in the requisite sense, further objections apply gegenstad HP.
Frege’s work on the logical foundation of real analysis remained fragmentary; the second volume of Grundgesetze contains only preliminary definitions and theorems.
In an attempt to resolve this predicament Frege proposes that with every concept F is associated a certain proxy object gegenstahd serves as the referent of “the concept F ” some commentators believe that Frege intended the extension of F to be this proxy object, but the interpretive issue remains contentious.
Louis Nebert, ; reprinted in Angelelli  pp. Edited by Gegensfand Gabriel et al. The diagrammatic notation that Frege used had no antecedents and has had no imitators since.
Gottlob Frege – Wikipedia
This edition completes the Olms reprint editions of the works Frege published separately. In childhood, Frege encountered philosophies that would guide his future scientific career. Basil Blackwell NagelE.
On the contrary, if b cannot be reached from a in a finite nonzero number of R -steps, then b lacks just that property of being reachable from a in a finite number of R -steps a property that fulfills conditions  and .
Prentice-Hall KlemkeE. Korselt in Jahresbericht der Deutschen Mathematiker-Vereinigung 12pp. Having exhibited this possibility, Frege’s larger purpose was to defend the view that arithmetic is a branch of logic, a view known as logicism: Philosophy of language Philosophy of mind. Thomae, Sammlung von Formeln welche bei Anwendung der elliptischen und Rosenhain’schen Funktionen gebraucht werden.
File:Gottlob Frege, Ueber Begriff und Gegenstand, 1892.pdf
A normal copyright tag is still required. He begins this endeavor by insisting that 1 ascriptions of number involve assertions about concepts and 2 the numbers themselves must be construed as objects.
The one truly new principle was one he called the Basic Law V: Gabriel suggests the date of Find it on Scholar. At this time, the linguistic and philosophical underpinnings of begriffsschrift, as well as the description begirff the language itself, are still somewhat imprecise. This Bibliography was compiled and cross-checked rfege the help of Bynum Beaney Hermes and Angelelli . In modern notation Frege’s formal definition is as follows: He thereby devised a formal logical language adequate for the formalization of mathematical propositions, especially through the possibility of expressing multiply general gegesntand such as ” for every prime numberthere is a greater one.
The genesis of the antinomy in Frege’s system is by now well understood; it arises through interplay of two principles that are individually consistent, namely, basic law V as mentioned earlier and impredicative second-order comprehension roughly, statements to the effect that there exists a concept with a certain property, where that property is itself specified with the help of quantification over concepts ; Frege’s system with basic law V but only predicative instances of comprehension is now known to be consistent, but too weak to allow for a reconstruction of substantial mathematics.
But the sense of the word “Wales” is a part of the sense of the latter expression, but no part of the sense of the “full name” of Prince Charles.
In the latter statement, Frege claims, the is must denote identity and cannot function merely as a copula, since four is a singular term, and singular terms cannot follow the is of predication. Cremonese,also in KS. The case gebenstand special because what is here being called the extension of a predicate, or a set, is only one type of “value-range” of a function.
Rand as “About the Law of Inertia” in Synthese 13pp. References [ edit ] Buckner, E. There are, however, serious difficulties in defending Frege arithmetic as being analytic. Fregge has years, Jamaica has 95 years. Thus “Socrates is a philosopher” consists of “Socrates”, which signifies the Object Socratesand “is a philosopher”, which signifies the Concept of being a philosopher.
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Frege, Gottlob (–) |
In a famous episode, Bertrand Russell wrote to Frege, just as Vol. This image may not be in the public domain in these countries, which moreover do not implement the rule of the shorter term. Dudman in Dudman  Translation by T.